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lhk931122 1 hours ago [-]
Doing it with a high-performance LLM would be best, but I think the token and time cost would be big, and just doing it code-based seems like it could work to some extent. But later, if LLM alignment gets good, it might not even be needed.
agybay_07 50 minutes ago [-]
Yes, the rules dont catch everything but since this is an open-source project, anyone can add new rules, and I'll be looking for new approaches.
as for the llm, it reads the same text as the agent, so it can be fooled as well)
lhk931122 33 minutes ago [-]
Of course, I do think it's really great in terms of cost. And since it's open source, it also has the advantage of being customizable.
philips 5 hours ago [-]
I have been working on putting agents into full gVisor isolation with a default deny egress proxy that includes secret injections. When an agent tries to connect outbound, by default it suspends the gVisor, holds the proxy connection open, and lets the user choose.
I am adding external judges now. But, there is a hypervisor key you press to deny/allow hosts without switching terminals.
I just can't get behind relying on the harness tool boundry to protect me.
hedgehog 2 hours ago [-]
Are putting the agent core and the workspace in separate containers? I do a limited version of that to prevent runaway tests etc from stopping jobs but making it a stronger boundary seems like a good idea.
Would love to collaborate with you on this since we’re building something analogous internally.
maven29 9 hours ago [-]
You could cover a lot more adversarial scenarios with an ebpf backend. It needs linux, but with all the patches going around, you should be doing all your dev in a VM anyway.
https://eunomia.dev/agentsight/
agybay_07 9 hours ago [-]
[dead]
emscb 4 hours ago [-]
From the README, matching is text-level and nothing is sent out. So it seems to judge with rules, not an LLM. Is that right?
agybay_07 1 hours ago [-]
yes
agybay_07 12 hours ago [-]
I've built project that helps to protect your computer from dangerous commands that your ai agent might execute. Have you noticed how often dont even check what our agents are actually running? Thats why I created Stroq.
Try it locally npx @stroq/cli
embedding-shape 10 hours ago [-]
> helps to protect your computer from dangerous commands that your ai agent might execute
How does "a local audit of what your coding agent did and why" help prevent dangerous commands? Sounds like your solution comes too late, innit? Sure, I can see that at 16:48 the agent ran "rm -rf --no-preserve-root" but if it already executed it on my personal computer, isn't it too late then?
Personally, I think this solves the wrong problem. If you're one stray "rm" away from letting the agent delete stuff on your personal computer, you're running the agent harness the wrong way. At least give it its own user, ideally limit what paths/network it can use, but don't rely on "auditing" to prevent dangerous commands, it'll bite you in the future.
arnarbi 10 hours ago [-]
You are correct, but it's generally very hard to come up with good access control policies up front. Also, as you grant more access the system tends to become over-permissioned over time, and often you don't really find out until so wrong that it hurts. The ability to audit is necessary to maintain good policies. It allows you to discover gaps in your policy even when things didn't break terribly.
agybay_07 10 hours ago [-]
You’re right
the command from my comment only generates a report and doesn’t actually prevent anything. stroq init sets up hooks that prompt for confirmation before a dangerous command is executed—but that’s a filter, not a sandbox
brkomir 8 hours ago [-]
I have received two pre-interview repos from recruiters on LinkedIn (NK hackers targeting crypto people), and both would be hard cases for this. Almost all offers there in DMs are now fake recruiters, and it's not trivial to figure out if the account is fake.
One had an eval() hidden inside a controller function named getCookie(), running whatever a remote server sent back. npm start, npm build and npm test all triggered it. Cursor didn't catch it when I asked "is this repo safe to run?" and then told it to check all dependencies.
Other one came as a bunch of Solidity files in a zip file with an issue to resolve as the interview task, nothing suspicious at first sight. However, that zip carried the whole .git folder, hooks included, which a git clone never copies, and the folder is hidden by default in Finder. Of course, there was a hook that fires on any commit or push, again eval() on some remote address.
In both cases the agent only runs npm test or git commit. Would Stroq see anything in these situations?
agybay_07 7 hours ago [-]
to be honest, in the first scenario, the hook will only detect 'nom test' command itself. in the second scenario 'stroq inspect' will identify the hook before the folder is opened and issue a warning. thanks for these examples :) I'll use them to improve product
agybay_07 10 hours ago [-]
[flagged]
hmokiguess 11 hours ago [-]
feature suggestion:
background daemon that continuously scans and alerts in a menubar app when a positive match is found
clicking the menubar app shows the offending entry, clicking the entry lets you redact, delete, repair, mark as false positive, etc.
agybay_07 11 hours ago [-]
Thanks) good idea
sebion7125 5 hours ago [-]
I'm wondering if that could be part of a prompt injection warn system in the future. Did I get it right, that it does not need an LLM to evaluate sessions?
agybay_07 1 hours ago [-]
Yes, that’s correct. the rules already flag this kind of text
MakazhanAlpamys 8 hours ago [-]
homie lets keep building
q17 6 hours ago [-]
cool project! ...so is it pronounced, like, stroke? lol
agybay_07 1 hours ago [-]
oh no, I hadn't made that connection until now lol
I am adding external judges now. But, there is a hypervisor key you press to deny/allow hosts without switching terminals.
I just can't get behind relying on the harness tool boundry to protect me.
How does "a local audit of what your coding agent did and why" help prevent dangerous commands? Sounds like your solution comes too late, innit? Sure, I can see that at 16:48 the agent ran "rm -rf --no-preserve-root" but if it already executed it on my personal computer, isn't it too late then?
Personally, I think this solves the wrong problem. If you're one stray "rm" away from letting the agent delete stuff on your personal computer, you're running the agent harness the wrong way. At least give it its own user, ideally limit what paths/network it can use, but don't rely on "auditing" to prevent dangerous commands, it'll bite you in the future.
One had an eval() hidden inside a controller function named getCookie(), running whatever a remote server sent back. npm start, npm build and npm test all triggered it. Cursor didn't catch it when I asked "is this repo safe to run?" and then told it to check all dependencies.
Other one came as a bunch of Solidity files in a zip file with an issue to resolve as the interview task, nothing suspicious at first sight. However, that zip carried the whole .git folder, hooks included, which a git clone never copies, and the folder is hidden by default in Finder. Of course, there was a hook that fires on any commit or push, again eval() on some remote address.
In both cases the agent only runs npm test or git commit. Would Stroq see anything in these situations?
background daemon that continuously scans and alerts in a menubar app when a positive match is found
clicking the menubar app shows the offending entry, clicking the entry lets you redact, delete, repair, mark as false positive, etc.